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Difficult Dialogues:
The Technologies and
Limits of Reconciliation
DAWNE MOON

Projects known as dialogue or reconciliation build on the common ground
between members of historically adversarial groups to help overcome vicious
cycles of retaliation. They do so by helping people to relate, in Martin Buber's
(1970 [1923]) sense of the term, to those they perceive as "Other," and thus to
transform through interaction how they define themselves. While some posit
that the deep interpersonal understanding that reconciliation fosters is actually central to most or all religious traditions, reconciliation projects can also
facilitate a mode of non-institutional spirituality, thus inviting us to explore
one of the sociology of religion's "edges" this volume seeks to re-center. In
this mode, participants may see institutional religion as fallible and human
but see reconciliation as bringing contact with something transcendent and
universal-a truth long known in their particular religious heritage, and others as well, but forgotten in many institutions. Such reconciliation projects
may be experienced as "spiritual" rather than "religious," transforming selves
precisely by bringing together people who might normally be institutionally segregated. At the same time, instances such as those I discuss here can
only arise when they are explicitly distanced from politics, and thus paradoxically they may reproduce the very hierarchies some participants wish to
overcome.
While this research ventures outside of congregations and looks at movethat cross religiOUS boundaries, its real force lies at a different edge of
sociology of religion by helping us to locate the ambiguous effects of the
r ... ",~cu"-feeling efforts at dialogue or reconciliation and the ways these
can both inspire and frustrate desires for political transformation and
. It has been argued that lasting political transformation depends on
in how people identify themselves as members of a group in relation to
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other groups (Todd 2005). Not all participants are drawn to reconciliation/dialogue because they want to effect political change, however; many simply are
tired of political conflict and the violence it involves. For these dialogue efforts
to be fully effective, they need parties from either side of a historical conflict,
and this is why it resides at a point of tension. To elucidate this tension, I begin
by exploring how these groups can be effective; I then explore the limitations
of dialogue, focusing on the paradox that emerges when the groups in question
are characterized by an imbalance of power or privilege.
I compare observations from two studies of religious and religio-ethnic
communities. The more recent is a qualitative study of American Jews' understandings and experiences of anti-Semitism and how it relates to politics, particularly around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 1 I compare some of the findings
from this study with findings that emerged in my earlier ethnographic research
on debates about homosexuality within the United Methodist Church (Moon
2004, 2005a, 2005b). In the broader study of American Jews and their understandings and experiences of anti-Semitism, I used voice-recorded intensive
interviews with a snowball sample of thirty-two respondents, ranging from
one hour to three-and-one-half hours. 2 Here I focus on two closely related
organizations that were a subset of this research, an international dialogue
and peace organization called Listening with Love, and a loose network of local
groups called Palestinian-Jewish Reconciliation Circles that meet monthly,
usually in different members' homes, to share their stories and practice listening attentively to each other in order to overcome suspicion, defensiveness,
and hatred. 3 Interviews were grounded in and supplemented with participant
observation in workshops and public forums, including a two-weekend training session with Listening with Love and a four-day retreat organized by the
core members of a Reconciliation Circle. I also draw here from interviews with
members of an organization called Jews for a Just and Lasting Peace, which
engages the conflict in the Middle East at the political level, but whose members
echo some principles of dialogue. Because these concepts grew out of a study
of Jews, I have so far interviewed a relatively small number of Palestinians.
While Palestinian perspectives will be the focus of future research, critiques
that have emerged in the current research have been sufficient to point to some
of the tensions inherent in dialogue and reconciliation.
Discussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are invariably controversial,
especially when one discusses power. To be sure, there is a huge range of opinion
among Israelis, Palestinians, and others who identify with either or both groups,
and this chapter explores some of the middle ground. However, the basic conflict might be roughly summarized as follows. To many Palestinians, Israel is a
militarily strong occupying government founded unjustly and illegitimately on
Palestinian lands, and now funded largely by the United States, whose forces
have and continue to dispossess and dehumanize people in the West Bank and
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Gaza by taking away their livelihoods; cordoning them off into isolated areas
where water, food, and medical treatment are scarce and difficult to access; tearing down people's homes at will; appropriating their land; imprisoning people
indefinitely without charge; and consigning people to refugee camps. While
Palestinian citizens of Israel are treated better and have some rights, they experience discrimination, for instance, in unrecognized Arab towns that receive
inferior government services. To many who identify with the state of Israel,
Palestinians are a group of Arabs, politically backed (but perhaps abandoned
when it comes to humanitarian support) by the entire Arab world, determined
to eradicate the Jewish presence in the Middle East and killing Israelis in random terrorist attacks to make their point. 4 During the Nazi Holocaust, which
was one among many large-scale attacks on Jews historically, many Jewish
refugees literally had nowhere to go; shiploads of people were turned away from
the United States and other countries and sent back to Europe to face whatever dangers they might. The state of Israel, born in the wake of World War II,
became both a symbol of redemption and a desperately needed refuge. That refuge is a tiny country, the size of New Jersey, subject to attacks, both violent
and discursive. Some have argued that the state of Israel is subject to a "new
anti-Semitism" that uses the same tropes as traditional anti-Semitism but on a
global scale: they see the Jewish state being verbally attacked and delegitimated,
held accountable for offenses that draw little international notice when committed by other countries, and scapegoated for offenses committed by many governments (Chesler 2003; Dershowitz 2003; Foxman 2003). Many of my Jewish
interview subjects identified to some extent with the state of Israel, and at the
same time, many were critical of its treatment of the Palestinians.
My interview pool was not representative of the American Jewish public. 5
Most of the Jews I spoke to in this research came from families that ardently
supported the state of Israel, but many respondents experienced a feeling of
awakening when they learned of the Palestinian perspective. Some went to Israel
and saw the way Palestinian citizens of Israel, as well as residents of the West
Bank or Gaza, were treated. For others that feeling came when they saw a play
or read a book that prompted them to question the definition of the situation
with which they had grown up, and for others yet it was simple exhaustion with
all the violence that led them to look for a way to bring about peace or prompted
them to find out "the other side of the story." Some have come to the conclusion
after looking into the situation that Israel has the upper hand in relations with
the Palestinians in terms of wealth and military power. Rather than seeing terrorism against Israel as one among many examples throughout world history of
anti-Semitism-the term David Norman Smith (1996) reserves for the mythologization of Jews as chimeric monsters (controllers of the world economy and
media, eaters of Christian children, and the like)-some see attacks on the
state of Israel as part of an ordinary conflict like other international conflicts
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over ordinary issues including borders and resources. 6 Given that the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is one of the two main factors Cohen and Eisen (2000) see
as contributing to a decline in the centrality of the state of Israel to American
Jews, it is likely that these findings may become more relevant in the future.

Theorizing the Selfin Interaction
This chapter explores the intersection of politics with the self, which sociological theories of the self have generally ignored. Mead (1967 [1934]) argued that
to be a person means internalizing the generalized other's view of the "me," seeing myself as others see me. He argued that we only become persons in interaction, that each human organism (his term) is at once an individual "I" and an
embodiment of his or her society, an object to himself or herself as much as to
those around him or her. But for all his importance and influence in sociology,
Mead's concept of the generalized other is a bit too simple. 7 The concepts of
Martin Buber (1965, 1970 [1923]) help us to understand the transformation
of the self that can occur in dialogue to produce intersubjectivity between parties who once viewed each other as Other, as outside their moral world. Like
Pagis's study of Vip ass ana meditation (this volume), attention to Buber's analysis helps us to rethink Mead's conception of the self and its relationship to the
generalized other.
For Buber, the inherent duality of humanity is not "the I and the me," as it is
for Mead, but two kinds of "1." He distinguishes the "I" in an I-it experiencewhen the other is regarded as an object of contemplation, of discovery, even of
affection-from the "I" in an intimate, I-you (Ich-Du, often translated as I-thou)
relationship.8 For Buber, a relationship with the intimate you occurs when for
each person the other is "infinitely there," touching the core of the self. It may
sound a bit mystical, but as a sociologist, Buber insisted that the communion
between souls that can happen when they relate in what he calls dialogue is a
real occurrence, much as the communion people experience in collective effervescence is a concrete, empirical reality in Durkheim's (1995 [1912]) theorization. As Buber explains in his 1929 essay "Dialogue,"9 to engage in dialogue is
to open oneself to being touched at the core, stepping out of the "armor" we
wear in everyday life. For Buber, when someone "says" something to me, in a
song, a sermon, a lecture, or a conversation, for instance, he or she touches me
at the core. To be attentive is Buber's term for being open to such a connection.
Buber is careful to point out that I-it interactions are essential, and not necessarily negative; asking a professor to explain a concept, for instance, or asking for directions or medical advice is essential to functioning in the world,
but a problem emerges when this kind of interaction is mistaken for relating.
For Buber, the I of the I-it experience is the ego, who "occupies himself with
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his My: my manner, my race, my works, my genius," while the I of the I-you
relationship is the person, who is open to "infinite conversation" (1970 [1923],
114). He remarks:
Egos appear by setting themselves apart from other egos.
Persons appear by entering into relation to other persons.
One is the spiritual form of natural differentiation, the other that of
natural association.
The purpose of setting oneself apart is to experience and use ....
The purpose of relation is the relation itself-touching the You. (1970
[1923], 112-113)
For Buber, relating to another person transforms the self; its lack of instrumentality and its mutual understanding resonate with Habermas's concept of communicative rationality. We have all probably had such moments, though like
affect, they are difficult to know in another or to describe in any way resembling "objectivity."
Buber distinguishes true relating from imitations. He distinguishes "genuine dialogue" from "technical dialogue," which is solely concerned with gaining objective understanding, and "monologue disguised as dialogue," in which
"two or more men, meeting in space, speak each with himself in strangely tortuous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they have escaped the torment of
being thrown back on their own resources" (a description that evokes graduate
seminars a bit more than any of us might like; 1965, 19). Under this heading,
he includes debate, in which "in the speaking are so pointed that they may strike
home in the sharpest way, and moreover without the men that are spoken to
being regarded in anyway present as persons"; conversation, marked "solely by
the desire to have one's own self-reliance confirmed by marking the impression
that is made"; and other facsimiles of dialogue that separate people rather than
connect them (1965, 19-20). These distinctions acknowledge that genuine dialogue can be difficult to achieve, especially when egos intervene. I suggest that
egos are not the only thing that can intervene; hierarchies of authority can
prevent relating, even as relating can disrupt hierarchy.
The dialogue groups I observed work by getting people into a room together
with those they view as opponents and keeping them all coming back. Such
processes thus depend on participants not becoming too alienated or threatened, even if the legitimacy of their tacit authority is challenged. Since discussions of politics can easily degenerate from debate into shouting matches
that could drain participants of energy for no reward, dialogue groups walk
a fine line. As Amanda Udis-Kessler (2008) demonstrates in her study of the
United Methodist General Conference of 2000, when opponents convene to
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make policy decisions without the transformation of consciousness that comes
from relating to each other in Buber's sense, the interaction can feel like a war
between groups from utterly different moral worlds (see also Hunter 1992):
Thus, dialogue groups endeavor to avoid politics, focusing on giving each participant the time and space to "tell their story," speaking "from their hearts."
In doing so, they give participants the opportunity to humanize each other, to
see each other as members of the same moral community (Baumann 1989; Fein
1979; Tavuchis 1991). Broadening the moral community changes the "generalized other" one internalizes, and thus changes the self by internalizing the
gaze of, rather than repudiating, those once deemed anathema.

Relating Versus Knowing One
Buber's distinction between relating and experiencing helps us to understand
a puzzle that emerged in my earlier research on debates about homosexuality
in the United Methodist Church, or UMC. I would ask my interview respondents how they had come to their current views. Those who believed that
homosexuality was sinful cited a range of things: the Bible, their comfort about
their convictions (which, as one woman remarked, God would surely disturb
were she on the wrong track), their knowledge that God loved order and that
homosexuality flouted it. In contrast, I was struck by pro-gay church members'
recurring accounts of gay people close to them: a brother who had come out
recently; a gay friend, relative, or child; a speaker who expressed pain at being
shut out of the church. In spite of the mainstream lesbian, gay, bisexual, ~nd
transgender (LGBT) movement's strategy of "coming out," encouraging every
LGBT person to make her or his sexual orientation or gender identity known
to friends, coworkers, neighbors, and everyone else, it seemed a facile truism
that "knowing one" made all the difference. After all, plenty of members of the
congregations I studied also knew gay men or lesbians and still believed homosexuality to be sinful-in their view, wanting to be nice to gay men and lesbians at the expense of upholding the word of God was understandable, but
sinful, and would condemn to hell those one should be helping to find salvation.
Similarly, in Udis-Kessler's study, pro-gay "inclusionists" chanted slogans such
as "See our people" and "Know your people" (2008, 64) and tried to encourage
delegates to get to know LGBT participants, but neither strategy moved those
who believed that knowing gay people was beside the fact that homosexuality
was sinful. Again, the assumption that "knowing one" was sufficient to change
minds led pro-gay members to make an argument that seemed irrelevant to
their opponents.
When my research moved into the arena of American Jewish understandings of anti-Semitism and its relationship to Middle East politics, I finally
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understood what I had been seeing. Again, the theme of "knowing one" came
back. For instance, Julia, a 57-year-old Jewish environmental activist and artist, told me about how reading Israeli geographer Meron Benvenisti's (2002)
Sacred Landscape opened her eyes to the Palestinians' experience of Israel, a
country she had loved since her childhood. She remarked:
And you know it's a great sadness to me, one of the first things I'll
often say to a Jewish person if they have a lot of, you know, what I
would say are misperceptions, I would say, "Have you, do you have any
Palestinian friends? Do you even know any Palestinians?" And almost
across the board, no. They might have met a Palestinian shopkeeper.
They never exchanged stories. After I read that book I went around
and I would meet Palestinians in many places, there are lots of them
here and as soon as they might say where they were from, Ramallah
or Hebron or somewhere, I would say, "My name is Julia, I'm Jewish,
I'm really sorry." And instantly, everyone of them, from old, grizzled
men to young girls, all, just filled with the anger of the Palestinian
cause, would embrace me. Everyone of them would open their heart
immediately, just by my saying that, just saying, "I understand what
happened to your people, and I'm sorry." And one couple of brothers in
Taos, New Mexico, they brought out the Qur'an and showed me where
Muhammad says, "See, he says we're supposed to all be like brothers, Christian, Jew, and Muslims across the board." Just saying I'm
a Jewish person and I'm sorry for what happened to them. I couldn't
help it. I just felt so terrible. lo
Nicholas Tavuchis (1991) argues that apology is an effort to reestablish membership in one's moral community when one has violated its norms, saying:
[Alpology expresses itself as the exigency of a painful re-membering, literally of being mindful again of what we were and had as members and,
at the same time, what we have jeopardized or lost by virtue of our offensive speech or action. And it is only by personally acknowledging ultimate
responsibility, expressing genuine sorrow and regret ... that the offender
simultaneously recalls and is re-called to that which binds. (1991, 8)
In Julia's case, the apology is to people who are often seen as belonging to a different moral community; Julia's apology is in effect a claim that she and those
to whom she is apologizing do belong to the same moral community, a claim
affirmed in the New Mexico men's invocation of the Qur'an. It is not simply
"knowing one" that makes the difference; relating, in Buber's sense, implies seeing another as part of one's moral community, or as Habermas might say, as part
of one's lifeworld.
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Julia described a trip she had taken to Israel with Listening with Love
(LWL), an international organization that seeks to foster relating between
members of historically opposed groups. The organization offers training and
practice sessions to teach antagonists to hear and understand each other so
they may move beyond the cycle of mutual suspicion, hatred, and defensiveness. Listening with Love posits that human beings are all linked by a core,
fundamental "essence" of "values that we all share," including love, safety,
compassion, beauty, courage, creativity, freedom, friendship, generosity, joy,
truth, trust, and the like, and its organizers facilitate dialogue between Jews
and Arabs, Jews and Germans, and other historically antagonistic groups. The
organization also offers training sessions so that people may learn their techniques and apply them in their daily lives. At the training session I attended,
facilitators presented their model: each human being has a core, which has been
wounded by life's disappointments, injuries, injustices, and attacks. Defenses,
or what Buber (1965, 10-11) calls "armor," have grown to protect those wounds
and the vulnerable core, but they can be counterproductive as they often prevent people from relating to each other, or in LWL's terms, from seeing each
other's "true self." The organization teaches that the extreme of defenses arguing back and forth at each other is war, but when people can open themselves to
each other, telling their stories and being heard, then peace is possible.
The process thus resembles the evangelical Protestant process of racial
reconciliation that Emerson and Smith (2000) discuss. In their account,
which summarizes Yancey's (1998) analysis, reconciliation as it was defined
by the early founders of the movement takes place in four steps: (1) developing primary relationships across racial lines, (2) recognizing social structures of inequality, (3) whites' repenting "of their personal, historical, and
social sins," and (4) African Americans' willingness to forgive, individually
and corporately, when asked, repenting of anger and whatever hatred they
hold toward whites and the system (see Emerson and Smith 2000, 54-55).
As Emerson and Smith found, however, the recognition of social structural
imbalance implicit in the model brought a political element into reconciliation that cohered in no way with white evangelicals' worldview and thus
found resistance. Efforts at reconciliation without acknowledgement of
social structural hierarchies could result in blacks feeling that their white
counterparts were making a shallow effort at best. Emerson and Smith
describe the beginnings of reconciliation theology in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, saying:
Some of the white elite evangelicals attempted reconciliation, but
incompletely. The problem with whites' conception of reconciliation,
many claimed, was that they did not seek true justice-that is, justice both individually and collectively. Without this component,
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reconciliation was' cheap, artificial, and mere words. It was rather like
a big brother shoving his little brother to the ground, apologizing, and
then shoving him to the ground again. (2000, 58)
Later, I will explore similar political tensions in the dialogue/reconciliation
movements I discuss here, but first it is important to acknowledge that even
when the process is incomplete, it can have some of its desired effects. First,
dialogue and reconciliation processes can indeed help to humanize adversaries, which may be no small feat. At a retreat organized by the PalestinianJewish Reconciliation Circle, a Palestinian-American woman I estimated to
be in her thirties who was active in the movement spoke of having been
raised on stories of what "the Jews" did to her family in 1948-taking their
homes, making them into refugees. She felt she was raised to hate, but she
didn't want to raise her own children that way, so the Reconciliation Circle
offered her the opportunity to overcome that legacy without having to forget the past. Others, who had never had the opportunity to talk to someone
from the other side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, became friends with
them and felt hope that peace was actually possible. At a press conference
after the event, an Israeli woman whose son was serving in the Israeli army
spoke of having met a 16-year-old exchange student to the United States
from Iraq:
He said, "Don't hate me, but growing up, my parents taught me that
we have to hate you, that you are awful people." After a half hour of
wonderful dialogue, he said, "I'm sorry I feel this way; you are actually sweet." We greeted each other every morning with a smile and
a kiss; now I'm going home to tell my son that peace is possible.
[Reconstructed in notes]
While simply learning that adversaries are human might seem so simple as to
be banal, it can actually be profoundly terrifying, troubling one's worldview
and pre-existing relationships. Ken, a 69-year-old retired pediatrician and the
organizer of a Reconciliation Circle, remarked on the "great courage" it can take
to participate, mostly because of the fear of what one's "own people" would say.
He commented:
We're talking about fear. Fear, part of it is fear not only of the Other,
but also of your own people .... You're seen as a traitor, you're seen as
naIve, you're seen as not intelligent, which is a terrible thing in the
Jewish community. You're seen as on the Left. Oh my goodness. It
takes great courage to move out to the Other. You take flak from your
own people, usually.
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To illustrate this difficulty, Ken told me about an incident with a local
newspaper:
The most powerful criticism dynamic that I have had is, a couple of years
ago, in the local Jewish newspaper, there was exaggerated demonization
of the Palestinian people, the Palestinian schools, and the Palestinian
textbooks. And I am familiar with the university-based research about
those things. And this article was hateful. And there was a photograph
of like a 3-year-old Palestinian with a Kalashnikov, semiautomatic rifle
that somebody took somewhere ... [a]nd the point was, "They're teaching all their children to kill all the Jews." And I just couldn't [let that
go], so I wrote an OpEd, an opinion-editorial, and I simply quoted the
Israeli academicians and their findings of the Palestinian textbooks, and
schools .... I just quoted academics, but [people in the area] projected the
worst things onto [my wife] and me, and onto the Reconciliation Circle.
They took out ads, actually, in the newspaper. ... And, they just called us
all the names, you know: naIve, traitors, um, Arab-sympathizers ....
In his comments, he demonstrated the effectiveness of the dialogue techniques
he had honed in the Reconciliation Circle, saying:
And you know what I did? I phoned everyone of them. And you know
what? The ads disappeared, in two weeks the letters were over, and I
would say I'm still in relationship with the people who wrote them. I
phoned them and I really listened to them. I asked them what their
stories were, I got into their frame of reference. They felt heard. I felt
understood. I told them what my motive was. It wasn't done from a
distance of blaming or fist-[shaking] across a campus green.
In addition to humanizing the Other, Ken reveals how such processes can
impart skills for de-escalating conflicts, as well as building relationships with
past adversaries.
Habermas's distinction between the formal world and the lifeworldis instructive. The lifeworld is what constitutes mutual understanding, while formal
world concepts constitute a reference system about which mutual understanding is possible (1981, 126). The lifeworld is the realm of the taken-for-granted
and, in Buber's terms, of the real relationships that shape us at the core, while
the formal system is a realm of solely I-it interactions. To problematize the lifeworld is to destabilize a person's whole worldview and problematize the core of
the person, as happens when people observe a reality that does not conform
to their symbolic imaginary: when people from either side realize that the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the battle between good and evil they may
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have assumed it to be; or when they realize homosexuality is not actually the
derangement or evil it symbolizes in heterosexist common sense.
Dialogue humanizes the Other, transforming the self in the process. When
dialogue works best, participants come to see each other not as representatives of evil forces that have been out to destroy them, but "as human beings";
in other words, like apology in Tavuchis's formulation, dialogue allows people
to see each other as members of the same moral community. Even people who
have hurt and killed others, such as Combatants for Peace (the real name of
an organization of former Israeli soldiers and Palestinian fighters), can come
together, admit to the harm they have caused others, and explain why it seemed
justified at the time, as well as how they have since come to see otherwise.
People who seemed to occupy the formal world, the world of objects-violent,
oppressive, frightening, selfish, impure, chaotic-enter into the lifeworld, the
realm where mutual understanding is possible, the realm of relating. Regarding
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, dialogue participants come to see people who
"love peace" as part of the "us," while they see those who seem to prefer wargovernments, war profiteers, the hateful-as the redefined outsiders. They
do so at some risk, however-they risk the security of their old view for the
unknown. In Ken's words, they risk alienating their "own people"; they stand to
forego a relatively popular position of "we're good, they're evil" for a rarer one,
and most frighteningly for detractors, they risk making themselves open and
vulnerable to people who could exploit their weaknesses.
When Jewish people such as Ken and Julia related to Arabs and Arab
Americans, and when Arabs related to Jews, they regarded the Other as part
of their moral community, and it was simply implausible that an entire people could be inherently violent, less loving, or less deserving of a happy life.
Similarly, relating to someone who was gay or lesbian, in my earlier research,
made the stigmatization of gays and lesbians seem preposterous, dangerous,
and profoundly unfair. When respondents, including some members of the
conservative congregation I studied, related to gay men or lesbians, it became
implausible to them that God could find gay intimacy more sinful than heterosexual intimacy or find gay people to be less capable than heterosexuals
of doing God's work. The distinction between knowing and relating helps to
explain why pro-gay strategies fail to transform those who believe homosexuality is sinful-relating emerges organically; like collective effervescence, it
cannot be simply willed into existence among the unwilling.

The Politics of Dialogue
To introduce the concept of dialogue, Buber tells a story about a meeting he
attended in 1914, where someone raised an objection to too many Jews being
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nominated to help form an international organization. Sensing anti-Semitism
on the part of the objector, Buber raised his own objection. He writes:
I no longer know how from that I came to speak of Jesus and to say
that we Jews knew him from within, in the impulses and stirrings
of his Jewish being, in a way that remains inaccessible to the peoples
submissive to him. "In a way that remains inaccessible to you" -so I
directly addressed the former clergyman. He stood up, I too stood, we
looked into the heart of one another's eyes. "It is gone," he said, and
before everyone we gave each other the kiss of brotherhood .... In this
transformation dialogue was fulfilled. Opinions were gone, in a bodily
way the factual took place. (1965, 5-6)
In Buber's account, speaking from his heart to someone open to him transformed the man, his objection, and their relationship. But what if the Christian
man had not been open to Buber's words? What if he felt a personal stake in
maintaining his authority as a Christian to decide how many Jews should be
permitted into their group?
What those who called Ken a traitor may have sensed was that in addition to humanizing the other and teaching skills for de-escalating conflict,
dialogue can inspire people to learn about power dynamics they hadn't
known about, a step Yancey sees as crucial to early reconciliation theologians' process. For instance, Julia, who had gone on the trip to Israel with
LWL, remarked:
One reason I went on this trip is that I felt that so many Jews didn't
have the full story. That we had been given a lot of information that
didn't allow us to see and understand the humanity of the other
side and their suffering .... I wanted to go and with my own eyes
and ears come back with the stories that I could then bring back to
Jews. And part of me felt like, "Well, Israel doesn't really need the
American Jews," but it turns out so much money is coming from
American Jews that's going into terrible projects, that are making
things worse, that Israel desperately needs an enlightened American
Jewish public. In fact, the American Jewish [public] is more proZionist than the Israelis by and large. Because we're blinder, because
we're not living there and not seeing and understanding the complexity, the great complexity, the chaos and confusion and the suffering on all sides.
Similarly, 42-year-old Lisa belonged to Jews for a Just and Lasting Peace
(JJLP), an organization that seeks to work in solidarity with the Palestinians.
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Having grown up with a grandfather she admired and saw as a model of
Jewish ethics, she had always understood that being Jewish meant both
fighting racism and supporting the state of Israel. She experienced a moral
crisis upon her first visit to Israel and Gaza when she was in her twenties,
having seen Israelis treat Palestinians in ways she could only describe as profoundly racist. She told me of the difficulties she had with her father over
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, given their family's intense commitment to
Zionism. Lisa remarked:
[My partner] is very close to my dad, and she said, "The thing about your
dad that's so funny, is that if he were traveling and met a Palestinian
family over dinner he would fall in love with them, and he'd be the
first person sitting there crying, listening to their story. He would so,
on a heart level, connect to them." And so for people like that, which is
most of us really, that's an important thing that he has to experience,
to get to break through this ignor-you know, naIvete.
For Lisa and others, as for the reconciliation theologians Yancey discusses,
humanizing the other was a tremendous first step, but insufficient. When I
told Lisa that some of her comments resembled those of members of the
Reconciliation Circle, she remarked:
I haven't done [Reconciliation Circle work], but the critique is there's
no political analysis. And what I'm talking about, just trying to talk
to people in your family, just trying to get through that, the barrier
is emotional. But of course what you need to get it to is the actual
political analysis of how we can make it better.... I mean my hope
would be, with the dialogue groups, [that] people realized we need
some more, real, fair peace negotiations. That it's actionable, instead
of, you know, a warm and fuzzy feeling. But yeah, I think all that has
to happen.
This politicization speaks to a tension involved in dialogue or reconciliation.
Talking about one's own feelings and experiences and telling one's personal
story are the means; participants are urged to avoid talking about politics, precisely because "politics" involves polarization, needing to win, and armoring
instead of opening oneself to the other. Yet deep beneath the surface, the ends
seem to have a political aspect-once people learn to humanize each other,
they may well come at some level to advocate political transformation. They
may even come to understand their own people as benefiting from an imbalance of power and privilege. If they state that outright, then those who oppose
such analyses will object to dialogue. But if they do not, they do a difficult
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dance, as 69-year-old JJLP member Diane remarked about her own
at a previous Reconciliation Circle retreat:
They put us in little talking groups, at different times, and I was with
an Israeli Jew and an Israeli Palestinian, who lived neighboring towns,
and who had just put a niche in their fenced off area and some of the
parents and some of the children were doing projects together, and
being nice to each other. And you could see, they were both extremely
nice men, and you could see how very fond they were of each other. The
question [we were given to discuss] was something like, "What's causing this rift, or this conflict?" and they were very careful, you know,
the Israeli Palestinian didn't say that what's causing this conflict is
that we're being oppressed and persecuted, and I said, "It seems to me
you can't have balance. You're talking about a mighty military power
and a basically unarmed people trying to hold on." And so that, I find
that troublesome. That that truth has to somehow be managed, within
a dialogue. But on the other hand, there were some profound connections made. And it's, you know, I have read that Palestinians in the territories [of the West Bank and Gaza] only see Jews with guns, pushing
them around, and Israelis only see Palestinians in suicidal bomb gear.
So they don't know each other. They never see each other. So, I have
mixed feelings about it, but it was an amazing experience.
A story from my field notes taken at a later Reconciliation Circle retreat helps to
illustrate the complications of this kind of organized "relating." The event was
the fourth annual retreat of this sort, hosted at a Jewish summer camp, but it
was a much larger affair than it had been in years past, which presented some
logistical problems for the organizers. With roughly 200 people in attendance,
only a quarter were Arab or Arab American. The group was broken into groups
of four for the first workshop of the day to allow each group member to speak
uninterrupted for a minute about his or her feelings about each of a number of
emotionally-and politically-loaded terms, including "right of return," "suicide bomber," and "Jerusalem," but many groups had no Arabs, mine included.
Dora, a Canadian Jewish woman who was approximately 45 years old, and Orit,
a 17-year-old Israeli woman, both expressed disappointment that our group
had no Arabs. "I wanted to talk to some Arabs," Dora commented, "I wanted to
hear their perspective." While Buber might see such claims as verging on I-it,
objectifying experiences, the women's reactions were understandable. People
invested a good deal of time and money, and traveled great distances, to come to
this event, and they hoped to learn something new from it-to relate to Arabs.
As it became clear to the organizers that some groups were without Arabs, the
events were quickly reorganized. For the next session, our group was merged
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with a group that included Ali, a 30-ish Palestinian high school teacher from
Jerusalem, and May, a Palestinian American woman who was about 45 years
old whose father had helped organize the event. Ali started the discussion off,
asking how our group's morning discussion had gone.
"It wasn't that interesting," said Dora, "We all pretty much agreed on
things."
"Oh," challenged Ali, "so you all agreed that the Palestinian right of
return would be a bad thing!"
"Well, I just don't know what would happen to us, to Israelis, to Jews,"
said Orit. "What would happen?"
"No one ever thought to ask what would happen to the Palestinians
when the state of Israel was created on our land. Why should anybody
ask what will happen to Israeli Jews now?"
"But it's my home," Orit replied. "Where would we go?"
"It was the Palestinians' home before. No one asked where we would
go."11

The conversation continued in that vein with Ali at the center and members
of the group taking turns asking him a question or presenting an alternative
viewpoint, to which he would then respond. Facilitators circulated among the
groups and would say things like, "Try not to talk about politics. Just focus
on your feelings," as they walked by ours. At the time, I felt annoyed by the
whole exercise. I was annoyed with Ali for assuming he knew what I thought,
without giving me or anyone else a chance to actually speak his or her mind.
I was annoyed that he had set the terms of the discussion. I was annoyed at
the way he seemed to steamroll over a 17-year-old. As I reflected on the experience that afternoon, I thought about it another way: here was a Palestinian
man visiting from West Jerusalem, coming to a Jewish camp, in the numerical
minority, with Jewish prayers painted in brightly colored signs on the walls,
in the United States, a major source of monetary and military support for the
state of Israel. Everyone ostensibly came to work for peace, but what leads to
peace? Talking about your feelings? Or asking questions about equality and
what one sees as preventing it? Would it even be possible for him to talk about
how he felt about the Palestinian right of return without talking about "politics"? Would such a discussion feel like anything more than "cheap, artificial,
and mere words" (Emerson and Smith 2000, 58)?
Our discussion that afternoon felt like a failure, by the organizers' standards, because no one gave voice to any breakthroughs. No one embraced
and said, "Now I know peace is possible." It felt pointless; it enacted Buber's
description of debate with remarks "so pointed that they may strike home in
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the sharpest way, and moreover without the [people] that are spoken to being
regarded in any way present as persons" (1965, 19). No one from our group was
asked to speak at the concluding press conference. We were not a testament to
the healing and transformative power of dialogue. Whenever I tried to find Ali
later to see if he might sit down with me for an interview, he seemed to always
miss my gaze and walk on. This is the paradox: as Habermas describes, formal
world systems-polities-are entirely outside the lifeworld, although for Ali
it might have been impossible to discuss his feelings without discussing the
inescapable political realities into which he was born. Like Lisa, he might have
found it more pressing to discuss actionable, concrete realities rather than the
feelings of those who seemed to him to control his world with laws and military
power. To open himself to dialogue in the way Buber describes could have been
unthinkable in this context.
An anecdote from my previous fieldwork might help to shed light on Ali's
situation. Because so many pro-gay members of religious communities come
to their views through relating-to children, friends, siblings, and the likepro-gay movements often rely on the strategy of asking gay men or lesbians
to speak informally to a group of interested members, a class, or a discussion
group. But given that putative heterosexuals bear no stigma for their orientation and are often in the numerical majority that makes policy, such events
can feel like an audition-either for oneself or on behalf of the entire stigmatized group-for full entry into the moral community, particularly if saying
the wrong thing can affect the decisions of those with the authority to make
policy. While this strategy may introduce the issues to people and inspire further thought and inquiry, I have neither seen nor heard of it changing many
minds, particularly in cases where people are already firm in their convictions.
Such forums seem more often to produce what Buber would call technical dialogues or monologues disguised as dialogue.
Midway through my research in United Methodist congregations, Jenny, a
friend and key informant, invited me to join her at her parents' church where she
had been invited to speak as a lesbian about what inclusion in the church meant
to her. We had discussed my analysis that gay men and lesbians in my study
were repeatedly cast as being pained and how "gay pain" became the reason
for many members to welcome them into the church, and she was determined
not to fall into that pattern; she was not in pain, and she believed there were
compelling theological reasons for the church to welcome LGBT people. But the
structure of the event itself caused a sort of pain, or at least a demonstration
of pain. As the event began about twenty people sat in a circle and Jenny was
introduced. She had prepared remarks around the theme that human beings
cannot always know God's will, but that God can surprise people, calling us to
do things that go against societal expectations. She began by reading scriptural
stories of prophets and disciples being called to drop everything they knew in
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life and heed God's surprising call. But before she had completed her first sentence, she was in tears. She struggled to get her message out while crying, and
soon several others, myself included, were crying as well and someone had to
be dispatched to find a box of tissues. The very question at stake, the purpose
for the gathering, was the question she had hoped to take as already answered:
whether she had equal access to God's revelation, whether she was a full person
in the eyes of God and the church, whether the stigma she bore resulted from
social conventions or timeless truth. It is difficult for a community discussion
of who belongs in the community-of who can speak for the community and
who can only, at its discretion, speak to it-to produce conditions of full equality within that community since the question itself prefigures some members'
exclusion.
In Udis-Kessler's (2008) research, inclusionists thought that if conservatives just "knew our people," they would change their minds; in the inclusionists' lifeworld, God makes some people gay, and same-sex love and intimacy
teach people more about God's love. This knowledge comes from the relating
that happens in the lifeworld, so their knowledge cannot be explained to their
opponents in any satisfactorily objective-seeming terms. Those who believe
homosexuality is sinful, on the other hand, see homosexuality and all it symbolizes to them (selfishness, carnality, politics, chaos, and the like; see Moon
2004) as firmly entrenched in the formal world-what evangelicals consider
the fallen, human world. They cannot enter intersubjectivity with inclusionists
because their prior understanding of homosexuality and what it symbolizes
does not permit entrance into the realm of relating into their moral community. The symbolic violence LGBT people and their supporters experience in
Udis-Kessler's study is the violence of being forcibly shut out of their lifeworld,
their church, by those with the authority to do so-in terms of votes and tradition. In my own research (2004, 2005a), this pain became the admission price
for the lifeworld to which they thought they had belonged all along: for gay
and lesbian members to be seen as truly belonging in the church, they must
perform pain; they cannot present themselves as whole persons simply seeking what any church member seeks in church. But to be forced to represent
only one aspect of one's personhood-and a wounded aspect at that-is not
relating; one's "whole self" is not quite welcome, but only the broken parts that
fit within a particular, strategic narrative. That scenario becomes another of
what Buber calls "faceless specters of dialogue" (1965, 20), in which one cannot
relate or be related to because parts of oneself are silenced and one must take
care to appear a certain way.
Returning to Ali at the retreat, to what extent does dialogue feel like "auditioning" for membership in the moral community of people who have a greater
say than oneself over policies and the distribution of resources? As Diane
asks, to what extent do some people's personal stories seem too "political" for
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dialogue, and what happens to dialogue when aspects of some personal stories are unspeakable? The goal of the weekend was to foster relating, and it
succeeded in many cases. To relate to people previously outside one's lifeworld
context involves some kind of feeling of sacrifice, for everyone involved. But
to what extent might such an event feel to Palestinians the way it can feel for
a gay person to be asked to speak to a group of people who mayor may not
believe that he or she is a living symbol of sin, fallenness, and carnality? To
what extent might such a conversation feel like an audition to be recognized as
fully human or a much-needed opportunity to convince those who might have
more political leverage that there is something profoundly unfair happening
that needs to be changed?
On a hike after the incident at the retreat, I spent some time getting to
know a friendly man who was around 50 years old, a Jewish man named Saul.
He expressed an interest in political discussions, so I asked him whether
he thought there was anything odd about trying to talk about something
like the Palestinian right of return without talking about politics. He gave it
some thought and got back to me later, saying:
I was thinking about what you said and I had a conversation with a
woman named Bobbie. She had a communication problem with a man
that left her feeling misunderstood. They talked about it later and
cleared it up. I think it's good that we leave politics aside and focus on
just trying to understand each other. [Reconstructed in notes.]
He had a point, but after the event when I interviewed Jamil, a Palestinian
involved in a Reconciliation Circle, he hesitated to answer many questions
and repeatedly referred me instead to a local Palestinian advocacy group. I
left our two-hour interview with the distinct impression that as a spokesperson for reconciliation, he did not feel he could say anything verging on the
political.

The Paradox of Dialogue
As Buber argues about relating, Habermas argues that in communicative
action, people are transformed. He writes:
Communicative action is not only a process of reaching understanding;
in coming to an understanding about something in the world, actors
are at the same time taking part in interactions through which they
develop, confirm and renew their memberships in social groups and
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their own identities. Communicative actions are not only processes
of interpretation in which cultural knowledge is "tested against the
world"; they are at the same time processes of social integration and of
socialization. (1981, 139)
When a new grouping is formed, in the case of the Reconciliation Circle,
or when the group's stated membership criteria are in flux, in the case of
Protestant homosexuality debates, the collectivity and participants' personal
self-concepts are redefined. But in cases like these that can be prefigured by
tacit speech-rules about what can and cannot be said, particularly about
power relations, these redefinitions are not complete, real though they may
feel to those at the unacknowledged top of the hierarchy. These hierarchies,
when unspoken, can be tacitly reproduced as well, particularly if there are
double standards about who can tell his or her own story in his or her own
way, whose story is legitimate, and what kinds of personal truths are too
"political" to be uttered. In those cases, stigmatization is reproduced, even as
those closer to the top of the hierarchy genuinely feel that they have transformed, given of themselves, or made themselves vulnerable in the name of
reconciliation. The gag rule impedes those at the bottom from being fully
expressive, from feeling understood, and perhaps from being transformed
in the process. As Buber (1988 [1965]) posits, genuine dialogue is free from
needing to appear a certain way to another. However, if people are allowed
to "discuss politics," then the whole concept of dialogue could easily revert
to the polarized conflict dialoguers commit to sacrificing and transcending.
This is the paradox.
There are solutions to this paradox. One is to avoid dialogue altogether,
ridiculing it as naively idealistic or banal or seeking to discredit its participants as traitors. On the other hand, some maintain that politics and relationship come together; they commit to solidarity and can hear political
critiques of their own power and privilege without feeling personally attacked.
Politicization can light a path forward. When genuine dialogue occurs, people
feel transformed, spoken to, understood. But the line between genuine dialogue and the imitations Buber discusses is not always clear. When genuine
dialogue happens, social hierarchies that were previously naturalized can
come to seem profoundly arbitrary and unfair. But since dialogue cannot be
objectively assessed, a semblance of it can renaturalize the hierarchies it fails
to demystify. Still, dialogue and the relating that takes place in it are real
phenomena that we need to consider when we think about hierarchies in communities and when we think about the relationship between social power and
the self. Indeed, when we ignore it, we cannot understand the social change
that happens, and does not happen, in communities bound by relationship.
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Taking reconciliation/dialogue seriously calls us to consider the boundar_
ies people draw between social convention and timeless truth, lines straddled
by both institutional knowledge (religious and otherwise) and extra-institu_
tional forms of knowledge (religious and otherwise). If sociologists consider
only institutional religion in our studies of how people make their lives meaningful, we close our eyes to the fact that to be defined as "truth" one must
define it-whatever one believes it to be-as transcendent. In that sense,
religious and nonreligious contexts overlap considerably (and where a person
feels at home depends on where one has found truth). Acknowledging that
considerable overlap, we can see more clearly the profound ways in which
those with more privilege to define the terms of dialogue can-as they try
sincerely to express what feels deeply true to them-delegitimize others'
truths, and silence the very people with whom they wish to reconcile.
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Notes
1. As Gamson (1992) discusses, the naming of this conflict is itself highly controversial. Given that many of the Arabs most directly implicated in this struggle identify as
Palestinian and are identified by other respondents as such, I use this term. I thus refer to
the conflict as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
2. In addition, I conducted two focus groups involving another twenty-seven respondents.
3. To protect confidentiality, names and some identifying details of people and organizations have been changed.
4. Helpful summaries of the ideological and political tensions appear in Lerner (2003) and
Ruether and Ruether (2002).
5. For a more representative study of American Jewish attitudes, see Cohen and Eisen (2000).
6. British legal scholar Anthony Julius has argued that the state of Israel's founding father
Theodor Herzl envisioned that with their own state, Jews would have "ordinary enemies,"
fighting over ordinary things like borders and resources (Julius 2007; see Herzl 1988
[1896], chapter IV).
7. Habermas (1981) makes a similar argument but does not discuss Buber.
8. While Ich-Du is conventionally translated as I-thou, Kaufmann argues that this translation, with the archaic quality of "thou," fails to capture the familiarity of Du, the intimate
you that a child would use with his or her parents or that intimate friends use, which is
what Kaufmann argues that Buber intends.
9. Printed in Buber (1965).
10. Respondent quotations are from recorded interviews unless otherwise noted and have
been edited for readability (for instance, by removing extraneous utterances such as "urn"
and "like").
11. These discussions were reconstructed in field notes.
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